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Skill Compression, Wage Differentials and Employment: 
Germany vs the US 
 
 
The most popular explanation for the smaller creation of jobs in Germany than in the US in 
the 1980s and 1990s is the “wage compression” hypothesis that institutionalized wage setting 
compressed the wage structure in Germany relative to the market determined wage structure in the 
US.  Higher pay in the bottom rungs of the earnings distribution in Germany (and other EU 
countries), the argument goes, cut off low skill jobs, particularly in the service sector.  The 
implication is that only by reducing pay and increasing inequality can Germany and the EU achieve 
US levels of employment and unemployment (Siebert 1997). 
 
There is empirical plausibility to this argument.  As table 1 shows, the distribution of 
earnings is much narrower in Germany than in the US and much of the difference between US and 
German employment per adult is found in the service sector. In addition, during the period when the 
employment-population rate fell in Germany relative to the US and when the German unemployment 
rate rose relative to the US unemployment rate, the dispersion of pay rose in the US but held steady 
in Germany. Thus the wage compression story seems to fit both the cross-section and time series 
evidence.  
 
But there is another potential explanation for the difference between the US and German 
wage structures which runs counter to the wage dispersion explanation of joblessness. This is that  
the distribution of skills is itself more compressed in Germany than in the US (Nickell 1997, Nickell/ 
Bell 1996, Nickell 1998).  If less skilled workers are more skilled in Germany than in the US while 
German and American skilled workers are similarly skilled, some of the narrow dispersion of wages 
in Germany would represent a compression of skills.  Measured in “efficiency units”, the German 
wage distribution would be more dispersed than nominal wages indicate, cutting the ground under 
the wage compression argument. 
 
So, how different are the German and the US skill distributions overall and among types of 
workers?  To what extent do skill differences explain the lower dispersion of wages and return to 
education in Germany than in the US?  Are low-skilled workers better paid in Germany than in the 
US because they are more skilled or because Germany relies on institutions to set wages? 
 
These are difficult questions to answer, in large part because we lack good measures of labor 
skill across countries.  The most commonly used measure, years of schooling, is not directly 
comparable between the US and Germany because the two countries have very different educational 
systems. German education involves apprenticeships, which differ greatly from formal schooling in 
the US, so that it is necessary to develop some mapping between apprenticeships and formal 
schooling to make valid comparisons.  The content or quality of German education and American 
education also differs.  Even ideal measures of comparable education, moreover, may not fully 
capture the workplace competencies that underlie individual productivity and wages.     
   2 
In this study we deal with these problems by developing equivalence classes between US and 
German schooling and by using scores on the quantitative part of an adult literacy test to contrast 
workplace competencies. We combine information on employment, wages, and schooling from the 
Comparable German American Sectoral (CGAS) Database with data on literacy skills, income, and 
schooling from the OECD’s Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) for the two countries.  
 
 The CGAS is a two-country comparative study of employment and wages of workers in 
comparable industry and occupation cells for the period 1970 to 1995.  It takes data from the US 
Census of Population, the Current Population Survey, and the German Mikrozensus and social 
security files (Beschaeftigtenstatistik) to develop employment and wages for workers in comparable 
detailed demographic, education, occupation, and industry cells. The CGAS lacks observations on 
individuals, but it has information on workers in enough cells (theoretically up to 1.2 million cells 
per year, though some cells are empty and others have too few observations to be useful) to provide 
substantial cross-section and time series variation in relevant variables (for more details see 
Freeman/Schettkat 1998). 
 
The International Adult Literacy Survey is a multi-country study that measures the ability of 
adults to understand and use printed information through reading, writing, and numeracy, in their 
workplace and daily life.  It is the first major international study focused on the workplace-related 
literacy skills that workers have.  It includes data on employment, unemployment, income, and other 
socio-economic variables.  Germany and the US were two of the countries in the initial seven-
country study. 
 
We find that:  
 
1.  Measured in equivalent skill units or in literacy scores, Germany has a more skilled work 
force than the US, with a more compressed distribution of skill. This contrasts with the 
picture found in nominal years of schooling, which show that Germany has fewer years of 
education and a more dispersed distribution of those years. 
 
2.   The principal difference in skills between American and German workers is in the bottom 
rungs of the skill or education distribution, where Americans have much lower literacy 
skills than Germans.  While about half of this difference is due to low skilled-immigrants 
to the US,  many native-born Americans still have very low skills. 
 
3.   The widespread belief that American schools do not work well notwithstanding, each 
year of schooling in the US adds more in literacy skills than a year of schooling in 
Germany.  But the US trails Germany by so much in skills at the lowest levels that it does 
not attain equality in skills until the 15
th year of education. 
 
4.  The narrower dispersion of skills in Germany than in the US explains only a modest 
proportion of the lower dispersion of wages in Germany, leaving a considerable role for 
institutional factors in compressing the German wage distribution. 
   3 
5.  Jobless Germans have comparable skills to employed Germans and to Americans in the 
middle of the US skill distribution, while jobless Americans have lower skills than 
employed Americans. 
 
In short, comparisons of the dispersion of wages and relative wages based on measured 
wages exaggerate US-German differences in the distribution of earnings in “efficiency units”.  But 
even skill adjusted, Germany has a more compressed wage distribution than the US.   What casts 
most doubt on the wage compression hypothesis is the fact that jobless Germans have about the same 
skills as employed Germans and look more like average Americans than like low skilled Americans. 
 In the skill dimension, German joblessness has little of the structure that one would expect if it were 




Skill Distributions Measured by Equivalence Groups 
 
The most readily available measure of skills across countries is years of schooling attained.  If 
all school systems operated more or less similarly, years of schooling would be a reasonable 
indicator of the skills obtained from the formal educational system.  The United Nation's 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) would measure accurately skill 
attainment across countries.  
 
But schooling systems differ greatly across countries in such things as: the length of the 
school year and school day, amount of homework, class size, quality of teachers, and curriculum.  As 
a result a year of schooling in one country does not produce the same human capital as a year of 
schooling in another.  Differences in the skills young persons obtain from their home and social 
environment also produce differences in workplace competencies. Young persons with nominally the 
same schooling score differently on standardized international tests of attainment. 
 
Because Germany relies on apprenticeships to teach young persons work relevant skills, it fits 
poorly into standard international classifications.  Apprenticeships combine part-time schooling and 
part-time on-the-job training.  If one compares Germans and Americans with the same number of 
years of full-time schooling, the Germans will have superior skills because their apprenticeships give 
them additional schooling.  Thus, our first task for comparing US and German distributions of skills 
is to develop an equivalency between Germany’s skill creation through apprenticeships and years of 
schooling and American skill creation through formal schooling. 
 
Figure 1 shows the equivalence scale that we have established.  Most analysts will probably 
agree with our setting Americans with master’s degrees or more and Germans with university 
degrees as equivalent; and setting US bachelor’s graduates and Germans with Fachhochschule 
Arbitur + Fachhochschule as equivalent.  By these scales, Germans have a higher proportion of 
workers in the highest skill category while Americans have a  higher proportion in the second highest 
group.   Taking these two groups together, the US has relatively more highly skilled workers than 
Germany.     4 
In the least skilled groups we have put Germans with no certificate and Americans who have 
not graduated high school.  The difficult question is how to treat Germans with some completed form 
of apprenticeship and Americans with high school degrees or with some post-secondary education 
but no bachelor’s degree.  Apprenticeship gives Germans more skills than American high school 
graduates with no additional training.  We categorize those with Hauptschule and Apprenticeship as 
comparable to US high school graduates; those with Realschule + Apprenticeship; Abitur as having 
13 years of schooling; those with Hauptschule + Meister as having 14 years; and those with 
Realschule + Meister as having 15 years of schooling.  
 
The resultant distribution of workers by level of skill differs greatly between the two 
countries.  The vast bulk of Germans are in the second skill category while Americans are more 
widely dispersed across groups, with 45 percent falling into the lowest skill category.  Overall, 
Germans are somewhat more skilled, due to the large fraction of Americans in the lowest category, 




If our equivalency scales are roughly correct, Americans with just a high school degree 
should have literacy scores roughly equal to those of Germans with less than upper secondary 
education, whereas Germans with less than upper secondary education should have scores roughly 
equal to the mean score for the US.  This turns out to be the case (Freeman and Schettkat, 1999).   
Fifty percent of Germans who have not completed upper secondary education scored in the upper 
levels of the document scale (t levels 3 and 4/5, by the OECD classification) compared to only 17.1% 
Americans who did not graduate from high school (OECD 1997, Literacy Skills 156).  Thus, placing 
Germans with less than upper secondary education on a par with American high school graduates, 
and Germans with more education on a par with Americans with some post-high school education 
fits the distribution of literacy scores.  Although we did not create the equivalence scales to equate 
literacy scores, the quantitative literacy scores in figure 1 show that three of our four groups have 
similar scores for Americans and Germans, though the lowest skilled Americans have lower scores 
than the lowest skilled Germans. 
 
How much of the narrower distribution of earnings in Germany than in the US might be 
attributable to differences in the distribution of skills? 
 
To answer this question, we performed a two-part analysis.  First we regressed ln wages on 
dummy variables for our measures of skill from figure 1 
 
(1) ln W = a + b2
 D2 + b3
 D3 + b4
 D4  +σv 
                                                 
1 The comparison of levels of schooling depends on the units we attach to the four categories.  Using US 
years as a guide, we give 11 years to the first group 14 years to the 2
nd category, 16 to the 3
rd category and 19 years 
to the 4
th category.  Then we get 13.4 for the US and 14.1 for Germany.  The comparison of the distributions is more 
transparent.   The squared deviation of the difference between the proportion of persons in each category and the 
0.25 that would be in a category in a uniform distribution for the US is 0.08 compared to a comparable statistic of 
0.26 for Germany.     5 
 
where the lowest skill group is the deleted group and where Di reflects the ith skill group and bi is its 
estimated effect on earnings relative to the deleted group.  Then we used the resultant regression 
coefficients to examine the impact of the difference between the US and German distributions 
among the groups on the standard deviation of ln earnings of workers in the two countries. 
 
Line 1 of table 2 shows the “raw” standard deviation of ln wages in Germany and the US 
across cells in the CGAS: one measure of the phenomenon to explain.
2  By this metric, the dispersion 
in the US is  0.13 ln points higher than in Germany.  Line 2 records standard deviations of residual 
earnings from the simple regression of ln wages on dummy variables for skill groups.  The standard 
deviation in the US falls by 0.07 ln points while that in Germany falls by 0.05 points, reducing the 
difference in standard deviations by just 0.02 ln points or 15% of the initial difference. 
 
But the standard deviation in residual earnings differ not only because the distribution of 
skills differs between the two countries but also because returns to skill differ, potentially for reasons 
independent of the actual skills.  Taking the variance of equation (1) we get:  
 
(2) σ
2 lnW = b2
 2 σ 
2 D2 + b3
2 σ 
2  D3 + b4
2 σ 
2 D4 + 2b2b3 σ
2 D2D3 + 2b2b4 σ
2 D2D4 +  
  2 b 3b4 σ




Line 3 of table 2 records the b coefficients on our three skill equivalence groups from the ln 
earnings equation.  Being in the 2
nd skill category rather than the first (omitted) group has a larger 
impact on earnings in Germany than in the US, implying a greater skill differential in Germany than 
in the US among workers in these groups. The differential between the 3
rd and 2
nd skill groups and 
between the 4
th and 3
rd skill groups is, on the other hand, larger in the US.  The biggest difference in 
the structure of earnings occurs at the upper end of the skill distribution, where Germans earn a  
smaller premium than Americans.
3 
 
Line 4 of table 2 computes the dispersion in earnings that each country would have if it had 
its own returns to skill, reflected in the b coefficients, but the distribution of skills of the other 
country, and its own residual variance of earnings.  That is, we replace the σ 
2 Ds in equation (2) 
with the σ 
2 Ds from the other country.  Since so many Germans are in the 2
nd skill category, giving 
the US the German distribution of skills reduces the dispersion of earnings in the US, while giving 
Germany the US distribution of skills raises the dispersion of earnings in Germany. The standard 
deviation of ln wages in the US would be 0.02 points lower if the US had the German skill 
distribution while the standard deviation of wages in Germany would be 0.05 points higher if 
                                                 
2   These figures are based on cells that vary by years of schooling, age groups, industry, occupation, and 
gender, immigration status.  Since they give all persons within a cell the same wage, they understate the standard 
deviation in ln wages in both countries. 
3 The original source for wages in the CGAS  is the Beschäftigtenstatistik, which is censored at the high 
wage end because of the ceiling for social security contributions (see Möller for a discussion). Therefore, we 
underestimate wage dispersion in Germany. Whether this leads to overestimation of German-US difference in wage 
dispersion is not clear because fringe benefits (not measured as wages) are more important among high-income 
Americans. 
   6 
Germany had the US distribution of skills. Thus, from 10% to 17% of the US-German difference in 
the standard deviations of earnings across cells can be attributed to differences in the distribution of 
skills.
4   
 
That taking account of skills in this fashion eliminates only a modest proportion of the 
difference in the dispersion of pay between the US and Germany can be demonstrated in another 
way.  Line 5 of table 2 gives the standard deviation of ln wages within skill categories for the 
countries. There is surprisingly little difference in the standard deviations for the lowest skill group, 
but the US has 0.12 ln units higher standard deviation of pay in the key 2
nd skill group and even 
higher standard deviations of ln pay in the next two categories.  Again, the greatest difference in the 
dispersion of pay between the US and Germany occurs in the upper part of the skill distribution, not 
in the lower part. 
 
 
schooling tells a different story 
 
What if we use reported years of schooling rather than our skill equivalence groups in the 
analysis, treating years of schooling as comparable between the countries? 
 
 In this case, the quantity measures of skill would contravene the skill compression story.  
Figure 2 shows that the distribution of years of schooling for Americans is higher on average and 
more concentrated about the mean than the distribution of years of schooling for Germans.  
 
But if the actual skill of workers with the same years of schooling in the two countries differs, 
comparing the distribution of years does not properly test the skill compression claim.  Indeed, the 
skill compression hypothesis would predict that with such a metric, wages by skill group would 
differ between the countries.  Skill compression would show up in lower returns to schooling in 
Germany than in the US, reducing the overall dispersion of pay by an amount roughly comparable to 
the amount that of reduction in dispersion that we obtained in table 1. 
 
In part, the CGAS data bear out this prediction.  We regressed ln wages on years of schooling 
across CGAS cells in 1995 and then decomposed the variances of ln wages into the parts due to: the 
variance in educational attainment; the square of the coefficient on schooling in an ln earnings 
equation; and the variance of the residual in earnings from the equation: 
 
(3)  σ 
2  lnW = b
2 σ 




The standard deviation of the residuals from these regressions, σ 
2v measure the dispersion of 
wages within a country for workers conditional on the value of a year of schooling, b, and the 
dispersion of years of schooling, σ 
2  S.  Differences in overall dispersion of wages between the US 
and Germany can be attributed to differences in the three components.  
                                                 
4  This is without taking account of how the different distribution of skills might affect the 
return to skills.   7 
 
Line 1 of table 3 shows again the “raw” standard deviation of ln wages in Germany and the 
US across cells in the CGAS. Line 2 records standard deviations of residual earnings from the simple 
regression of ln wages on years of schooling.  The standard deviation in the US falls by .08 ln points 
while that in Germany falls by .05 points.  As a result the dispersion in schooling and in its returns 
explains 18 percent of the greater standard deviation in ln wages in the US than in Germany.  
 
 Lines 3 to 5 show that it is the higher returns to schooling in the US that explains the 
reduction in the difference of standard deviations of ln wages.  Line 3 records coefficients on years of 
schooling in the earnings equation: it is 0.11 across cells in the US compared to 0.07 across cells in 
Germany.  By contrast, line 4 documents that the standard deviation in years of schooling is lower in 
the US than in Germany, which by itself would make dispersion of wages less in the US.  Line 5 
shows that the standard deviation of ln wages in the US would fall by .04 points to 0.42 if schooling 
had the same return in the US as in Germany.  Conversely, the standard deviation of ln wages would 
rise by 0.05 points in Germany if it combined the US return to schooling, the German dispersion of 
schooling, and the German residual variance. Using the other countries distribution of schooling but 
the own returns to education only change the standard deviation of ln wages by 1% (line 6).  While 
these results are roughly consistent with the skill compression hypothesis if we interpret the lower 
coefficient on years of schooling in Germany as reflecting smaller differences in “real skills” by level 
of schooling in Germany, most of the difference in standard deviations occurs among workers with 
similar years of schooling. 
 
In sum, our measure of equivalency scales of skill lends some support to the skill 
compression story, but if we use years of schooling as our measure of skill, we must assume that 
differences in returns to schooling are due to differences in skills to interpret the relation between 
years of education and wages in a similar fashion.  If we had no other measure of skills, it would be 
hard to convince the skeptic that skill compression is that important.  But we have one additional 
way  to compare skills between Americans and Germans: in terms of literacy scores on the OECD’s 
adult literacy survey. 
   
 
 
Skill Distributions Measured by Literacy Scores 
 
In the early 1990s the OECD developed the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), 
which used the same survey instrument to measure the ability of adults to understand and use printed 
information through reading, writing, and numeracy, in their workplace and daily life.  It is the first 
major international study focused on the literacy skills that workers have and use at workplace. 
Although the IALS paper-and-pencil tests do not fully reflect workplace productivity -- a diligent 
pleasant employee may do more in trade or services than someone who fills out forms -- they offer a 
potentially better measure of skills in Germany and the US than years of educational attainment. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of literacy scores in Germany and the US.  By inspection, the 
German skill distribution is more symmetrical and concentrated around the mean than the US skill   8 
distribution.  The standard deviation of the scores is nearly twice as large in the US (0.30) as in 
Germany (0.16).  The main reason for this is that a substantial number of American workers but 
virtually no Germans have exceptionally low scores.  Indeed, while the mean and median of the skill 
distributions differ by just 7-8 points, at the 25
th percentile Americans score 29 points lower than 
Germans, while at the 5
th percentile, they score an amazing 77 points lower.  
 
One reason why the US has so many workers with exceptionally low scores is that about 13 
percent of Americans in the IALS are immigrants.  Immigrants averaged 217 on the literacy score – 
60 points below non-immigrant Americans, and were disproportionately represented among those 
with exceptionally low literacy scores. By contrast, just 8% of Germans taking the IALS were 
immigrants (age group 20-64 years), and these immigrants averaged 271 on their literacy score, just 
24 points below non-immigrant German citizens.  If we eliminate immigrants from the sample, the 
standard deviation in literacy scores among Americans falls sharply, from 0.30 to 0.23 while the 
standard deviation in literacy scores among Germans is unchanged at 0.15.  Thus nearly half of the 
difference in the dispersion of literacy skills between the US and Germany is due to the low literacy 
skills of US immigrants.  Even so, there remains a sizable 0.08 difference in the standard deviation 
of skills of the native born between the two countries, again concentrated in the lower tail of the 
distribution.  
 
Figure 4 shows starkly the difference in the skill distributions between the two countries for 
native born persons (panel A).  It records the ratio of the literacy scores of Germans to Americans at 
the same percentiles for each distribution.  Ratios greater than 1 indicate that Germans have higher 
literacy at that point in the distribution, while ratios less than 1 indicate that Americans have higher 
literacy.  The line for all workers, including immigrants shows a huge German advantage in skills in 
the lowest percentiles, falling to near equality around the middle of the distribution, and then falling 
to a slight disadvantage in the highest percentiles.  But the  graph for immigrants shows an even 
more stark difference (panel B): German immigrants are much more skilled in the lower rungs of the 
skill distribution and somewhat more skilled in the upper rungs.  The line for non-immigrants is the 
closest to 1.0 in the figure, though even here, low skill Americans do more poorly than low skill 
Germans. 
 
How should we interpret the exceptionally low literacy scores of low skilled American 
immigrants?  Given the huge immigration into the US of persons with very limited schooling, largely 
from Mexican and Latin America, the scores arguably represent a true measure of skills.  But to 
some extent, the scores reflect the fact that the native language of immigrants is not English,.  By 
concentrating in immigrant enclaves, many persons largely illiterate in English can function in their 




Schooling and literacy scores: the skill formation of schooling 
 
Thus far we have looked at schooling and literacy scores as separate measures of skill.  But 
these two measures are highly positively correlated.  Education produces higher levels of literacy;   9 
persons with high “innate” literacy scores invest in education more than others. Does the link 
between schooling and literacy differ between the US and Germany? 
 
To analyze the link between schooling and literacy scores, we turn to the IALS.  The raw 
IALS data show that Germans have relatively few years of schooling but reasonably high quantitative 
(other) literacy scores.  In part, however, this is due to the fact that IALS counts formal schooling 
only, ignoring the years of apprenticeship, which Germans obtain.  To correct for this  we compared 
years of schooling in the CGAS, inclusive of apprenticeship, and  years of formal schooling in the 
IALS and developed an adjustment procedure for correcting the IALS observations to take account 
of apprenticeship.  The procedure is described in appendix A. We use this corrected years of 
schooling measure throughout this study.  
 
Table 4 records the quantitative literacy scores of non-immigrants with different years of 
schooling.  We exclude immigrants because most of them have received schooling elsewhere and 
because the scores of US immigrants arguably understate their skills.  The table gives the mean 
quantitative score in each group, the score of the 5
th 50
th and 95
th percentile and the standard 
deviation of the scores.   There is a clear association between schooling and literacy scores in the 
table: the mean level of quantitative literacy rises monotonically with years of schooling in both 
countries.  In the underlying observations for individuals the correlation between years of schooling 
and the literacy score is .57 for the US and .35 for Germany.   
 
There are two noticeable differences in the relation between schooling and literacy between  
Americans and Germans.  First, at the lowest levels of schooling, Germans have much higher 
quantitative scores than Americans, while at higher levels of schooling, Americans have modestly 
higher scores than Germans.  The big difference in skills occurs at the bottom of the education 
distribution.  Second, the standard deviations in the table shows a much wider dispersion in literacy 
scores within schooling categories in the US than in Germany, concentrated also among low 
education groups.   
 
The concentration of US-German differences in literacy scores at the lower rungs of the 
education ladder suggests that years of schooling in the US are more effective in producing skills 
than years of schooling in Germany.  To examine this, we take years of schooling as given and 
regress literacy skills on years and other demographic factors: 
 
(4)  QUANT = a  + b S + cAGE  + v, 
 
where QUANT is the measure of quantitative literacy, S is the years of equivalent schooling; AGE is 
the age of the person. 
  
  Table 5 gives the results of this regression. The most striking finding is that years of 
schooling have a greater effect on QUANT in the US than in Germany.  An extra year of schooling 
adds about 12 score points in the US compared to only about 4 points in Germany.  German workers 
are on average more skilled because of the larger constant term in the regressions.  One interpretation 
is that this reflects more effective primary schooling (which everyone in both countries receive) in   10 
Germany. This is confirmed by dummy regressions in columns IV. We included a 'drop-out' dummy, 
which has a significant negative coefficient in the US but is insignificant in Germany.5  Another is 
that German families or culture gives students more literacy skills, schooling aside. The difference in 
the constant terms is sufficiently large that the US passes the German skill level on average only at 
about 15.years of schooling.  
 
 
Age coefficients are negative but small in both countries When we include an interaction 
term for age and education the age coefficient becomes significantly positive in the US. Since we 
cannot distinguish between age and cohort effects, this difference also allows for alternative 
interpretations.  It could be that Americans start with less skills and catch up as they age.  Or it could 
be that older generations of Americans are more literate than comparably educated younger cohorts.  
To the extent that literacy scores in fact measure workplace competency, the high age coefficient in 
the US fits with the high age-earnings profile that developed in the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
Columns III in the table pursues the impact of age and education on skills by adding an 
interaction term to the regression. The interaction is negative for both countries, suggesting that age 
and education are substitute ways of acquiring skills or, alternatively, that education has improved its 
effectiveness over time, so that the education of older cohorts was less productive in raising skills.  
The interaction is also larger in the US than in Germany, implying that whatever underlies this 
pattern – age or cohort effects – has been more powerful in the US. 
 
What are the implications of these findings for the skill compression hypothesis?   
 
The narrower dispersion of quantitative literacy scores in Germany than in the US supports 
the implication of our equivalence scales: that Germany has a narrower distribution of skills than the 
US.  The evidence that US schooling adds more to literacy than German schooling supports the skill 
compression interpretation of the lower return to schooling in Germany.  At least in part, Germany 
has a smaller return to years of schooling because skills are more weakly associated with years of 
schooling than in the US. 
 
But these calculations also highlight problems with the skill compression story.  The 
dispersion of wages but not the dispersion of skills differs most between the US and Germany among 
persons in the highest skill categories.  If we use the equivalent skill categories of figure 1, we obtain 
a comparable pattern.   In Germany the standard deviation of ln wages and of ln skills falls from the 
least to the most skilled group, consistent with the skill compression story.  But in the US the four 
skill groups have similar standard deviations of ln wages (around 0.40) but very different standard 
deviations of ln skills, which fall between the lowest group (0.33) to the highest group (0.16).  The 
higher dispersion of wages among the most skilled/educated Americans compared to the most 
skilled/educated Germans does not seem to reflect differences in the distribution of skills among 
those two groups. 
 
                                                 
5  We defined as 'drop-outs' those with 11 or less years of schooling in the US. For Germany we defined as 'drop-
outs' those with 9 or less years of schooling.   11 
 
From Compressed Skills to Compressed Wages 
 
To what extent does the compression of  skills in Germany than in the US contribute to the  
lower dispersion of  wages and return to education in Germany than in the US?   
 
We analyze this question by regressing the ln income on literacy scores and education in the 
IALS.  The IALS records personal income after taxes, which necessarily differs from the hourly 
earnings in the CGAS.  It differs between Germany and the US because the tax system differs 
between the countries, and because time worked differs on average and across individuals in the two 
countries.  In addition, the IALS records the position of workers in the German income distribution 
in 20 percentile categories, rather than actual earnings.  To analyze incomes, we transformed the 
percentile measures in the German distribution into incomes at that point in the distribution, and 
used those numbers as our dependent variable for Germany.  For comparability, we grouped the 
incomes of individual Americans in a similar fashion.  Thus, each worker in both countries is 
assigned one of twenty income numbers, depending on where that worker fit in the national 
distribution.  
 
There are three ways to model the link between wages and skills when we have both literacy 
scores and years of schooling as potential indicators of human capital.   
 
First, assume that schooling and other factors determine literacy skills which in turn affect 
wages: Schooling → Literacy Skills → Wages.  This suggest that we regress ln wages on skills (with 
other covariates) but not on schooling, and use the resultant b coefficient to assess the contribution of 
the compression of skills in Germany on the standard deviation of ln wages. 
 
Second, assume that schooling and other factors determine wages, and that literacy skill is a 
background factor that affects schooling: Literacy Skills Æ Schooling Æ Wages.  This is the 
standard human capital model with schooling dependent on skills.   
 
Third, assume that schooling and literacy scores are equally valid indicators of human capital, 
so that the appropriate regression is ln wages on both measures (with other covariates). This model is 
likely to attribute a smaller fraction of the dispersion of wages to skills since schooling is more 
compressed in US. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating these models.  
 
The two columns under model I give the results of estimating the model in which wages 
depend on the quantitative literacy score and covariates but not on schooling.  The standard 
deviations in ln incomes given at the bottom of the table are higher than the standard deviations in ln 
wages in table 2 because incomes vary with time worked as well as hourly wages. The dispersion for 
all employees is 0.27 ln points higher in the US than in Germany.  We experimented with limiting 
the sample to non-immigrants, but this did not reduce the standard deviations for either country -- in 
striking contrast to the huge effect of removing immigrants from the skill distribution in the US. This   12 
reflects the fact that almost any well-defined group of workers in the US has a wide distribution of 
earnings.   The estimated coefficients on the ln of the quantitative literacy score shows that literacy 
pays off more in the US than in Germany with an elasticity that is more than twice as large among 
Americans than among Germans.  Because the regression fits the US data better than the German 
data, the difference between the residual standard deviations is reduced to .21 (.778-.572)   Finally, if 
we replace the distribution of scores in Germany with the US distribution and the distribution of 
scores in the US  with the German distribution, but keep each country’s coefficients on ln scores, we 
obtain the results in the bottom line.  Increasing the dispersion of scores in Germany to the level in 
the US has virtually no effect on the standard deviation of earnings because the coefficient on ln 
score in the earnings equation is small.  Reducing the dispersion of scores in the US to the German 
level has a small effect in reducing the US dispersion.  The only way one can get noticeable effects 
of changing the contribution of scores to the country dispersions in ln income is if we were to 
postulate that Germany/the US had both the other country’s dispersion of scores and estimated 
impact of scores on ln income.  In this case, we would get a rise in dispersion of ln incomes in 
Germany of .06 points and a fall in the dispersion of ln incomes in the US of .05 points. 
 
The estimates of models II and III tell much the same story, with regard to the effects of 
changing the distributions of years of schooling (model II) or years of schooling and test scores 
(Model III) on the dispersion of ln incomes.  Because years of schooling is less dispersed in the US 
than in Germany, there is a slight increase in the US dispersion of ln incomes and a slight decrease in 
the German dispersion when we switch the dispersion of scores.  With the dispersion of scores and 
the dispersion of years of schooling working in the opposite direction, we get very little impact in 
Model III. 
   
Still, taking account of the difference in literacy scores does have a substantial effect on one 
German-US difference in ln income.  In the regression of ln income on years of schooling alone 
(with covariates), we obtain coefficients of 0.103 in the US and 0.043  in Germany. Inclusion of 
literacy skills reduces the effect of schooling on earnings in the US by 0.027   points and reduces the 
effect of earnings in Germany by 0.003  points.  Thus, .024 points of an initial .060 difference in the 
effects of schooling on earnings is attributable to the intervening effect of scores.  Put differently, 
40% of the difference in the impact of schooling on incomes between the countries is attributable to 
the differential pattern of skills across schooling groups. 
 
In short, the narrower distribution of skills in Germany than in the US does not account for 
the bulk of the difference in dispersion of income between the two countries.  There remains a 
sizeable difference in the distribution of incomes that presumably represents the effects of Germany's 
institutional wage setting vs the US's market wage-setting.  The next question to ask is whether this 
difference is associated with the composition of joblessness in the two countries.   13 
 
Skills and Joblessness  
 
 If the institutionally determined compressed wage structure  in Germany cut off labor 
demand for low-skilled workers while the flexible wage structure in the US allowed low skilled 
persons to find work we would expect that a larger proportion of the jobless would be unskilled in 
Germany compared to  the US.  
 
Table 7 shows the distribution by literacy scores of the employed and unemployed and of 
persons out of the labor force in Germany and the US in the IALS data.  What stands out in the table 
is the greater difference in quantitative literacy scores among the groups in the US than in Germany.  
The mean score for the unemployed and out of the labor force groups in the US are substantially 
below the score of the employed; whereas German unemployed and out of the labor force persons 
have scores only modestly below those of employed Germans.  Hence, unemployed Germans have 
skills much greater than unemployed Americans – indeed scores comparable to those of employed 
Americans.  And virtually no unemployed Germans have scores as low as those of unemployed 
Americans.   Among the unemployed the 5
th percentile of the German unemployed scores as high as 
the 40
th percentile of the American unemployed. For the employees, the gap is smaller the score of 
the 5
th percentile of the German employees is only reached by the 20
th percentile of the American 
employees.  
 
This pattern is inconsistent with the wage-compression hypothesis. In Germany, where the 
wage structure is supposedly so compressed as to price out low skill workers, they are reasonably 
highly skilled, whereas in the US where flexible wages are supposed to reduce structural 
unemployment problems, the unemployed are much lower skilled than the employed. 
 
This does not, however, mean that the less skilled are not more likely to be jobless in 
Germany than the more skilled.  Figure 5 rearranges the literacy-job status data to show the rates of 
employment for persons with given levels of literacy skills.  In Germany as in the US those with 
greater literacy scores have higher employment rates (and lower unemployment).  Indeed, the gap 
between the least skilled and more skilled is somewhat steeper in Germany than in the US, as the 
wage compression hypothesis would predict.  But there are exceedingly few Germans in those low 
skill categories.   In this sense, the data support the Nickel-Bell argument that Germany does not 






Analysis of the difference between German and US employment rates and dispersion of wages has 
generated two competing explanations of why Germany has lower employment: the wage 
compression hypothesis and the skill compression hypothesis.  Our examination of the distribution of 
skills in Germany and the US has shown that Germany does indeed have a more compressed 
distribution of skills than the US, due to the absence of a lower tail of less skilled workers, as is   14 
found in the US.  But the compression of skills explains only a modest proportion of the compression 
of wages in Germany compared to the US.  Adjusted for skill, the German distribution of wages 
remains more compressed than the American distribution.  But the skills of the German unemployed 
are too high for unemployment to be generated by the compressed wage structure and are sufficiently 
higher than those of low skill Americans to raise doubts about inferring what might happen to 
German employment were Germany to increase the dispersion of pay to US levels. 
 
   15 
Bibliography 
 
BLS, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997) Comparative Civilian Labor Force Statistics, Ten Countries, 
Washington. 
Freeman, R.B., Schettkat, R. (1998), From McDonald’s to McKinsey: Comparing German and US 
Employment and Wage Structures, Leverhulme II Conference, Institute of Economics and Statistics, 
Oxford 1998, forthcoming NBER paper.  
Freeman, R.B., Schettkat, R. (1999), The Role of Wage and Skill Differences in US-German 
Employment Differences, in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, special edition 
(Wolfgang Franz, ed.), 1999: 49-66. 
Moeller, J., (1998) Die Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit in Deutschland, in: Statistisches 
Bundesamt (ed.), Einkommen und Vermoegen in Deutschland – Messung und Analyse, Stuttgart: 
Metzel-Poeschel,169-193. 
Nickell, S.J., (1998) The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled: What Can Be Done?, in: Freeman, 
R.B., Gottschalk, P. (eds.), Generating Jobs, New York: Russel Sage. 
Nickell, S. J., Bell, B. (1996) Changes in the Distribution of Wages and Unemployment in the 
OECD countries, American Economic Review, 86 (5), Papers and Proceedings, 302-308. 
Nickell, S.J. (1997) Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, 3. 
OECD (1995) Literacy, Economy and Society, Paris.  
OECD (1997) International Adult Literacy Survey, Paris. 
OECD (1998) Employment Outlook, Paris. 
Siebert, H. (1997) Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, 3, 37-54. 
   16 
Table 1: Wage Dispersion, Employment-Population Rates and Unemployment Rates, 
Germany and US, 1973-1995 
 
 
Employment-Population rates (x 100)  Rate of 
unemployment 
Ratio of Earnings 
Male Workers 
D9/D1  Total Services   
 
Germany  USA  Germany  USA Germany USA Germany   USA 
               
1973-79  2.4 3.2  66.5  65.2 31.4 41.3  2.7  6.5 
1979-89  2.3 4.0  63.8  68.6 33.6 46.1  5.6  7.2 
1989-95  2.3 4.1  65.9  72.2 37.0 51.3  5.7  6.2 




-0.1 0.9 -0.6 7.0  5.6  10.0  3.0  -0.3 
 
 
Source: wage deciles from OECD Employment Outlook, 1973-79 data for 1979 in the US, 1983 in 
Germany; 1979-89 from 1989 in both countries, 1989-95 from 1994=3 both countries.  Employment-population 
rates, CGAS; unemployment rates, as defined by BLS to be comparable. 
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Table 2: Contribution of Skill Category to the Standard Deviation of Ln Wages, US and Germany,  








1  Standard deviation of ln(wage)   .466 .335 
2  Standard deviation of residual 
[ln(wage) regressed on skill 
equivalents] 
.399 .288 
3  Coefficients (Std errors) on 
Dummy variables for 
    Skill equivalent II 
    Skill equivalent III 












4  Standard deviation of ln(wage) 
with other country’s 





5  Standard deviation of ln(wage) 
with other country’s coefficient 





6  Standard deviation of ln wages 
within skill groups 
    Skill equivalent I                    
    Skill equivalent II 
    Skill equivalent III 














source: computations based on CGAS. Sample size for US 47068 cells; for Germany 42764 cells. 
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1  Standard deviation of ln(wage)   .466 .335 
2  Standard deviation of residual 




coefficient of schooling 
(standard error) 
.1087 (.0008)  .0740 (.0006) 




5  Predicted standard deviation 
of ln(wage) if coefficients for 
schooling  (b) from the other 
country, initial residuals used  
.426 .387 
6  Predicted standard deviation 
of ln(wage) if distribution of 
schooling from the other 
country, initial residuals used 
.471 .332 
 
Source: computations based on CGAS. Sample size for US 47068 cells; for Germany 42764 cells.   19 
Table 4: The distribution of  QUANT scores by years of 
education 
        
 (population 20-65 years, immigrants excluded)          
                
                
                
Years of   US          German
y  
     
Education   Percentiles  mean  sd (ln 
QUANT) 
n   Percentiles  mean  sd (ln 
QUANT) 
n 
 5th   50th  95th       5th   50th  95th       
9  96.5 213.5 305.6 203.7  0.341  163 202.8 280.8 341.7 277.7  0.164  299 
10 108.8 230.7 307.3 225.2  0.288  121 207.4 287.2 351.7 283.6  0.167  271 
11 140.8 237.9 332.4 233.9  0.241  109 218.1  287.0  337.3  286.1  0.130  133 
12 186.2 276.6 347.0 273.3  0.187  568 234.7 294.0 352.1 294.0  0.124  372 
13 216.8 299.0 384.3 295.5  0.154  147 249.7 303.9 359.3 304.6  0.111  306 
14 223.8 298.1 365.6 295.7  0.154  231 228.5 302.2 357.7 302.1  0.136  75 
15 242.1 310.9 366.4 305.6  0.142  95 242.2 318.6 369.4 312.3  0.137  70 
16 251.4 326.5 396.4 326.1  0.138  274 258.0 323.8 377.0 321.0  0.122  63 
17 232.8 334.5 394.3 330.2  0.136  89 246.4 313.5 368.9 311.1  0.118  44 
18 277.2 334.3 391.7 335.2  0.126  107 264.2 323.3 377.8 319.8  0.114  39 
19 272.9 344.9 394.1 338.9  0.123  59 290.1 341.3 374.2 338.9  0.085  41 
20 243.1 343.8 411.5 339.0  0.130  53 263.6 326.1 367.8 321.9  0.133  47 
                
Total       0.230  2062     0.148  1777 
                
Mean  years  of  education     13.600        12.3  
Standard deviation years of schooling 
(ln): 
  0.188       0.221  
                
                
Source: IALS data set, years of education in Germany adjusted (see 
Appendix). 
 for 11 years of schooling in Germany see Apprendix   20 
Table 5: Regressions of skills on schooling (population 20-65 years, immigrants excluded, OLS) 
 
 US  Germany 
 I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 














































Age*education  - -  -.1 
(.03) 
- - -  -.05 
(.02) 
 
Dummy   - - -  -34 
(3.9) 
- - -  3.2 
(3.0) 
R2 adjusted  .33 .33 .33 .35 .12 .14 .14 .14 
 
Source: IALS, Standard errors in parenthesis 
The dummy for the US is 11 or less years of schooling, i.e. it covers those regarded as dropouts. 
For Germany the dummy is 9 years or less of schooling since 11 years of schooling would be quite 
substantial in Germany. Those with 9 years or less of schooling may be regarded as a 'dropouts' in 
Germany.  
   21 
Table 6: The Impact of Skills and the Payoff to Skills on the Ln Incomes and the Dispersion 
of Income, Germany and US, 1991, (controlling for age, age-squared, sex, and immigrant 
status) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Germany  USA  Germany  USA  Germany  USA 
Lnscore  0.419  1.003      0.192  0.584 
  (0.130)  (0.081)      (0.134)  (0.092) 
Educ      0.043  0.103  0.040  0.076 






























             
Obs  924  1561  918  1545  918  1545 
R









Pred.  Residual 
If other country’s 

































             
  
Source: computations based on IALS, adjusted as described in the Appendix, standard errors in 
paranthesis.   22 
 
















Not in  
labor  
force 
-200  12.9 9.0  28.3  21.0 1.8  0.8  2.0  3.6 
200-250  16.6 14.3  17.6  20.3 13.3  9.9  24.3 16.4 
250-300  29.2 30.6  27.1  27.6 40.2  38.3  39.2 43.9 
300-350  29.3 31.7  23.5  24.6 36.2  41.1  27.9 29.7 
350-400  11.3 13.4  3.4  6.2  8.4  9.9  6.6  6.5 
400+  0.8 1.1  0.0  0.2 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
              
mean 
score 
277  287  242  255  294 300 281  285 
 
Source: Computations are based on IALS. 
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Source: Own estimates, wages are in national currencies, literacy scores are the mean of 5 quantitative scores, skills includes immigrants,  population  
20-65 years. Skill is the average points of the 5 items measuring quantitative skills.   24 
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Germany  26 
Figure 4: Ratios of literacy scores by percentiles, population 15-64, 
German score / US score 
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Figure 5: Employment-population rates by Literacy Score, 20-64 years
Source: computations based on IALS and BLS. * Germany ‘-200’ has a share in employment of .8% only. 
USA
Germany
*  28 
Appendix A: Adjusting the IALS Years of Education 
 
The IALS counts years of education only if schooling is 'full-time education'.
6  S i n c e  
apprenticeships are a combination of part-time schooling  (1 or 2 days per week) and practical training, 
apprenticeships do not count as years of 'full-time' education. Thus many persons in the IALS are counted 
in the categories ‘9 and 10 years of education’ (56%).  By contrast, in the CGAS, which includes 
apprenticeship years as part of schooling  many persons are counted in categories ’12 and 13 years of 
schooling’ (49%).  Thus the actual length of the education of Germans with an apprenticeship (as well as 
the classification in ISCED, see below) is misleading. Many Germans appear to have less education than 
they actually got.  
 
Since job-relevant skills are build-up during apprenticeships the classification of education in IALS 
is a misleading and will bias upward the 'scores' of Germans with low years of education. This may explain 
why Germans with low years of education score as high as the average American who has many more years 
of schooling.  
 
Including apprenticeships in years of education will shift many Germans from 9/10 years of 
education to 12/13 years.  To correct for the exclusion of the apprenticeship education in German years of 
education we adjusted years of education for non-immigrants as follows. 
 
The ideal adjustment would be to simply add 3 years to the education of Germans in the IALS who 
reported having served apprenticeships.  But the IALS contains no data on this.
7   So we randomly assigned 
an extra three years to enough Germans with 9 and 10 years of schooling to replicate the CGAS 
distribution at the lower level of the skill ladder.  Specifically, we draw a random sample of 44% of those 
with 9 years of education in IALS who had a quant-score
8 of 228 or higher. We used the limit of 228 
(which is the score of the 5
th percentile for those with 12 years of education in original IALS) on the 
assumption that those with an apprenticeship score on average higher than those who completed 9 years of 
'full-time' education only. For the group with 10 years of  'full-time' education we followed a similar 
procedure. Here the lower score-limit was 235 (the value of the 5
th percentile of those with 13 years of 
schooling in original IALS). We decided to expand the 13 years of education to the share found in CGAS 
rather than reducing the groups of ten years of education in original IALS to the share in CGAS.  
 
 
The small number of people who reported 11 years of education in IALS are very difficult to fit into the 
German education system. In some tabulations we gave them 11 years; in others we dropped that groups 
from the data because any reclassification seemed to be arbitrary.  This made no substantive difference in 
our results. 
                                                 
6 Questions asked in IALS (German questionnaire) 
Question 10 explicitly asks 'Insgesamt Schulbesuch, Vollzeit-Berufsschule, Universitaet' 
Question 12 asks: 'Welchen hoechsten allgemeinbildenden Schul- oder Hochschulabschluss haben 
Sie? 
Question 15 asks for 'abgeschlossene Lehre' but is not included in the IALS files.  
 
7 Additional variables A9 and A11 do not help because they refer to the type of the level 2 and level 
3 education. The ‘abgeschlossene Lehre’ question is not included in the ILAS files. 
 
8  'quant' is the mean of 5 variables measuring the scores in quantity tests in IALS.   29 
 
 